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You are being subjected to surveillance capitalism. 
Do you consent? 
Find out more
We value your Privacy! 
Yes
Figure 1: An artistic interpretation of an honest cookie consent notice.
ABSTRACT
The current web pesters visitors with consent notices that claim to
“value” their privacy, thereby habituating them to accept all data
practices. Users’ lacking comprehension of these practices voids
any claim of informed consent. Market forces specifically designed
these consent notices in their favor to increase users’ consent rates.
Some sites even ignore users’ decisions entirely, which results in
a mere theatrical performance of consent procedures designed to
appear as if it fulfills legal requirements.
Improving users’ online privacy cannot rely on individuals’ con-
sent alone. We have to look for complementary approaches as
well. Current online data practices are driven by powerful market
forces whose interests oppose users’ privacy expectations – making
turnkey solutions difficult. Nevertheless, we provide a bird’s-eye
view on privacy-improving approaches beyond individuals’ con-
sent.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy;Privacy protections;Economics of security andprivacy;
• Human-centered computing→Web-based interaction.
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1 THOSE DAMN COOKIE BANNERS!!
Cookie banners (i.e., consent notices) that randomly pop up to ob-
struct your view of something interesting on the web are, without
question, annoying. You are probably just as guilty as we have been
of clicking it away without reading what it said, thereby submitting
to questionable privacy practices. The sheer number of consent
notices users encounter while browsing the web can be aggravat-
ing. You might ask why this is even necessary. Consent notices
are the naïve answer to the complex problem of informational self-
determination on the web, where sites store so-called cookies in
your browser all the time. Cookies’ intended use was mostly cen-
tered around e-commerce features such as virtual shopping carts
and remembering logged in users. However, cookies turned out to
be a useful tool to mark visitors of one site and track their behavior
across other sites.
The intention behind consent notices is to grant users control
over their data and thus enhance their privacy. This overall goal
is becoming increasingly pressing with the rise of large-scale data
gathering and accompanying surveillance. How users could effec-
tively control if and how others profit from their personal data
remains an open question. Admittedly, consent notices are doing a
poor job at achieving this goal. They are supposably designed to
obtain users’ informed consent, yet nudge users to allow tracking
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behavior [1]. These nudges include default settings that allow all
kinds of cookies or the deceiving visual presentation and phrasing
of consent notices. In many cases, they do not comply with relevant
privacy laws, such as GDPR or the ePrivacy directive [15, 17, 24, 28].
And to top it off, they often do not respect users’ decisions, even if
they opt-out [15]. The current situation supposedly exists for the
visitors’ privacy benefit but not all involved parties want to achieve
that goal, resulting in a consent theater (similar to Schneier’s secu-
rity theater concept [25]). The ad-industry directs this theater, the
content providers and their visitors are the performers on stage,
and the regulators and policymakers are the audiences. This play
aims to convince the audiences of the ongoing practices’ legality
while minimizing harm to the director’s interest.
This paper offers a bird’s-eye view on the issue of consent-
notices, the accompanying data practices, and its different stake-
holders. We reviewed and analyzed the relevant body of research
in this area, touching on topics like tracking, online behavioral ad-
vertisements, and legal compliance. We found that in many papers,
users’ consent is the central point of investigation. However, this
perspective is not sufficient to solve the underlying issues, as we
have to deal with a complex ecosystem and conflicting interests.
Building upon this, we outline future venues of research and dis-
cuss the responsibilities of different stakeholders. The goal of this
work is to bring attention to and ultimately make progress towards
stopping the consent theater.
2 HOW COULD IT GET SO BAD?
Internet sites have begun early on to finance their content with
advertisements. Users understood and accepted that trade as con-
suming ads while getting content or functionality for free [29]. The
nature of this accepted trade changed after the dot-com bubble
burst. Google, which was under pressure to generate revenue, dis-
covered that they could use the behavioral surplus (i.e., users’ excess
behavioral data that the service itself does not utilize) from their
search engine to enhance the quality and value of online behav-
ioral advertising (OBA). This triggered the discovery of surveillance
capitalism’s foundation: The endeavor to corner the market for big-
data-based prediction products requires an arms race to collect and
accumulate increasing amounts of behavioral surplus [33]. Since
then, surveillance capitalists do not build new tech products for
the benefit of their users but to increase their access to behavioral
surplus.
Resulting from this development, website providers who use ads
tomonetize their content now also hand over their users’ behavioral
surplus (i.e., who viewed their content at which time) to advertisers.
Figure 2 provides an overview of personal data flows in online
behavioral advertising. In all cases, the advertisers embed code into
the content providers’ site. This code asks for the users’ consent
(optionally using consent management platforms) and only then
contacts the advertisers’ behavioral trackers. The trackers identify
the visitors across multiple websites and use this access informa-
tion to build users’ profiles. Increasingly detailed user profiles make
the ad-space more valuable since trackers can use them to predict
the advertisements’ effectiveness reliably. Commonly, trackers use
regular third-party cookies to identify visitors. However, the user
tracking does not depend on them since other mechanisms such as
cookie-synchronization, browser fingerprinting, super-cookies, or
Verizon’s Unique Identifier Header (UIDH) [30] achieve the same
effect. After the behavioral tracker identifies a visitor, a real-time
auction (based on the visitor’s profile) determines which advertise-
ment they will see. This type of online behavioral advertising (OBA)
has been mostly invisible to users since browsers just accepted any
cookies by default. However, the ePrivacy regulation and GDPR
made these practices more visible since users need to consent to
them.
The two main stakeholders in OBA are the content providers’
sites and their visitors. Visitors want to consume content or access
functionality, and sites want to monetize their content. Other stake-
holders, apart from these two, are crucial for the business model of
OBA. The ad-industry discovered that sufficiently large datasets on
users’ online behavior allow behavioral prediction and behavioral
modification. This extraordinarily lucrative opportunity drives the
ongoing efforts to collect increasingly more behavioral data since
even small improvements in predictions are worth millions [33].
Regulators and policymakers have found that these data practices
negatively impact users’ right to self-determination [6, 22]. This
is exemplified by the Internet users who are, despite the “consent”
mechanisms, unaware of how their personal data is used [18, 29].
Currently, their response consists of a policy to increase awareness
and repeatedly emphasize that users have the freedom of choice
of being surveilled or not (in the form of the ubiquitous consent
notices). In light of the significant fines that GDPR allows, consent
management platforms have become popular. They are used to ease
advertisers’ legal liability while simultaneously optimizing users’
consent rates for profit.
The fundamental conflict of interest in OBA is that trackers
base their entire business model on detailed user profiles that de-
mand ever-increasing behavioral data. All the while visitors feel
uncomfortable with that level of tracking and regulators want to
reestablish reasonable ways of informational self-determination.
This conflict of interest is difficult to untangle since many current
internet sites’ monetization depends on it.
3 OBSERVATIONS FROM PRIOR SECURITY
AND PRIVACY RESEARCH
The introduction of the ePrivacy directive and GDPR reignited
research interests in the topic of online consent mechanisms. Most
of the research surrounds questions of regulatory effectiveness
and users’ perceptions of consent notices and data practices. We
reviewed and analyzed prior work to see how researchers frame the
continued problems, which systematic issues emerge, and which
kinds of questions researchers pose. In this section, we present
three key-issues we identified and take a closer look at solutions
proposed in prior work.
3.1 Key Issue 1: Users largely do not
understand that behavioral online ads
require tracking
Research has invested considerable efforts into understanding the
internet users’ perceptions and behaviors concerning online track-
ing in general [4, 12, 18] and behavioral advertising in partic-
ular [16, 29, 31]. The findings paint a complicated picture and

















Figure 2: Online behavioral advertising (OBA) and all involved parties
conclude that user decisions are highly individual and context-
dependent, while at the same time exposing little understanding
for the complexity of web tracking. Melicher et al. investigated
users’ contextual preferences for web tracking and found that users
base their decisions to accept targeted ads mostly on concerns
about functionality [18]. Complementing, people saw value in user-
customized targeted ads [4, 18] and behavioural advertising [29].
However, acceptance of online behavioral advertising is highly com-
plex and context-dependent [29]. As Melicher et al. found, while
74% of their participants preferred targeted ads, 60% considered tar-
geted ads to be harmful in at least one tracking scenario [18]. Apart
from the nuanced attitudes towards targeted online advertising,
people often do not connect it with the concept of tracking. That is,
McDonald et al. found that while their participants in principle ap-
proved the idea of advertisement funding free online content, they
did not expect to be tracked in the process [16]. Research on users’
perception of tracking found a general lack of information and un-
derstanding of the technologies and concepts involved [12, 18, 31].
For example, Kulyk et al. found that people do not understand how
cookies work, what that meant for their life online, and what poten-
tial countermeasures look like [12]. If asked how tracking works,
people reveal concerns about their ability to make sound decisions
given their limited knowledge about the topic [18]. Yao et al. found
that even tech-savvy people, such as web developers, did not know
how online tracking works [31]. In their study, they identified four
“folk models” about how online behavioral advertisement works
and found these models to be either incomplete or inaccurate. To
name a few misconceptions, people thought trackers are hackers,
viruses, or have access to local files on the computer. If people have
mixed opinions about targeted advertisements and do not fully un-
derstand the workings and implications of tracking, which factors
do influence their tracking preferences? Research identified exter-
nal factors about the visited websites and the tracked data. On the
one hand, trustworthiness of the webpage, familiarity to the user,
and importance of the web page’s contents [12]. On the other hand,
the kind of data plays a role, such as personal or search information,
correspondence, financial, educational, or health information [18].
Finally, Melicher et al. found that awareness and consent to tracking
impacts people’s comfort with such practices [18]. However, this
is problematic and might promote a false sense of privacy. Also,
it hints at the core of the tracking issue: you cannot consent to
something you do not understand.
3.2 Key Issue 2: The ad-industry carefully
crafts consent mechanisms to deceive users
In the opinion of Acquisti et al. [1], neither paternalistic (govern-
ment regulation) nor strictly libertarian (self-regulatory) privacy
rules guarantee desired privacy outcomes. Instead, Acquisti et al.
suggest that soft-paternalistic approaches (i.e., nudges) may bridge
the gap between both approaches. In 1997 advertisers fought bit-
terly against a proposal by the FTC that would have assigned users
control over their personal information by default [33]. Instead,
they formed the Network Advertising Initiative that promised to
regulate the industry’s behavior. Garlach et al. [8], studied the ef-
fects of NAI’s self-regulatory notice-and-choice model and found
that users did not see the notice and did not understand its purpose.
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They found it hard to reconcile that the industry has expertise in
creating noticeable messages and chose not to create noticeable
and informative privacy notices.
Suspiciously, this is a re-occurring pattern in related work. User-
interface elements that would give users more options to opt-out
of tracking use confusing and and inconspicuous design. Acquisti
et al. [1] described different modes of soft-paternalistic nudges:
information, presentation, defaults, incentives, reversability, and tim-
ing. Privacy-related research has found evidence of most of these
nudging modes. Information: Machuletz et al. [14] recognized a
proliferation of choice in consent notices and found that users dis-
engage if more than a few data collection purposes are available.
Hence, they warn that businesses use the flexibility in designing
consent dialogues for their interest by maximizing data disclosure.
Presentation: The ad choices icon’ design uses unobtrusive colors
and sizes and hard to understand phrasing [8]. Commercial soft-
ware has habituated users to accept anything that resembles an
end-user license agreement [3], we have to assume that this is sim-
ilar for cookie consent notices. The most popular consent notice
designs are not the most effective ones [17]. Defaults: Half of the
websites do not have a reject all button, and 75% of the sites that
do bury this option – requiring more clicks than the alternative.
Additionally, 56% of sites pre-tick optional vendors [20]. Timing:
Consent-management platforms sometimes ask users excessively
for their consent decision (which they already have), bordering on
“consent harassment” [15].
The ad-industry seems to use the promise of self-regulation and
user consent to avoid stricter legal regulation while simultaneously
using nudges and biases to continue their business model. Conse-
quently, we cannot trust the advertisement industry’s mechanisms
that ask users for consent. On the contrary, we have to assume all
parts of these mechanisms use meticulous design to confuse users
and increase “consent” rates.
3.3 Key Issue 3: The advertisement industry
tries to avoid litigation by providing
consent mechanisms on the surface, but
often disregards the choice in the
implementation
The introduction of GDPR did not substantially impact web tracking.
Although its intention was strengthening users’ right to privacy,
researchers found no decrease in web tracking in the European
Union [5]. Degeling et al. argue that the supposed increase in trans-
parency may even lead to a false sense of privacy and security [5].
On top of that, they found that few websites offer meaningful
cookie choices to control tracking. Additionally, Mehrnezhad found
inconsistencies in the presentation of privacy notices and banners
within and across platforms [17]. In desktop and mobile browsers,
as well as mobile applications, consent notices often do not comply
with GDPR since they tie tracking to page load, not user consent.
Several works found non-compliance to GDPR and violations of
user consent [15, 24, 28]. Millett et al. identified four types of po-
tential GDPR and the ePrivacy directive violations of European
websites which are specific to consent notices: (1) storing consent
before the users’ choice, (2) not providing users a way to opt-out,
(3) pre-selected cookie choices, and (4) not respecting the users’
choice [15]. Similarly, Trevisan et al. conducted a large-scale mea-
surement of 35.000 European websites to check the implementation
of the EU cookie directive [28]. They found that half of the websites
install tracking cookies before users provide their consent. On a
global scale, Sanchez et al. investigated users’ ability to opt-out of
tracking [24]. According to them, opt-out mechanisms are often
not correctly implemented and confront users with deceiving infor-
mation. Additionally, long-lasting cookies are widely used, despite
users having opted-out of tracking.
Research demonstrates that users have to face a heterogeneous
ecosystem of consent notices that often does not respect their
choices, even though they make one.
3.4 Proposed solutions to the flood of cookie
decisions
Prior work has tried to find solutions for the flood of cookie de-
cisions for 20 years now. Most of them have tried to make the
individual users’ cookie decisions easier or more understandable.
However, a few also tried to tackle the problem not from an indi-
vidualistic perspective but rather from collective enforcement of
existing laws.
The Netscape browser implemented cookies first in 1994 to en-
able virtual shopping carts for e-commerce applications – resulting
in an increasing burden on users to make cookie-related decisions.
In the early 2000s, it was already clear that this burden is growing
too large for them since they had little information about these
cookies’ purposes, and the sheer number of cookie decisions created
habituation effects [19]. Friedman et al. [7] applied value-sensitive
design to create a browser-integrated cookie information interface
to help users to keep track and manage their cookies. Similarly,
Kulyk et al. [13] found that cookie-related browser settings confuse
users. They designed an alternative settings interface to bridge the
gap between the users’ privacy preferences and the rather technical
jargon of cookie settings. An alternative approach to the problem
of increasing cookie decisions is automation. Shankar et al. [26]
and Yue et al. [32] identified the problem that users face too many
cookie decisions and suggested a tool that only accepts cookies
required for a site’s functionality. These kinds of solutions can be
efficient by applying a pre-defined policy to all decisions. The au-
thors’ focus on functionality does not necessarily improve users’
privacy, which opens up the question of suitable cookie decision
policies. Such automation solutions provide an efficient way of
dealing with large number of cookie decisions by moving from
individual consent to generally applicable policies. This approach
leaves room for a discussion about the types of policies that fit the
users’ requirements in their different contexts of use.
One thing all of these approaches have in common is that they
come with an additional burden to users. They assume that it is
the users’ responsibility to understand the purposes of cookies and
set them in a privacy-aware manner. Even automatic approaches
to cookie management require users to handle edge-cases where
pre-defined policies fail. However, other stakeholders such as the
browser vendors, ISPs, websites, and law enforcement can combat
the flood of cookies – by focusing less on individual users’ behavior
and more on the behavior of other stakeholders has the potential to
improve the current status of privacy on the web substantially. An
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example of this kind of approach to improving cookie privacy is
Trevisan et al.’s large-scale measurement [28]. They measured sites’
cookie handling and found many configurations that do not respect
the ePrivacy directive. Their audit tool, CookieCheck, automatically
verifies legal violations and simplifies the enforcement of existing
regulations on a large-scale, independent from individual users’
behavior.
4 QUESTIONING THE UBIQUITOUS
PARADIGM OF CONSENT
In 1983 the German Federal Constitutional Court identified the fun-
damental right to informational self-determination in the context
of modern data processing. The decision enshrined the users’ right
to decide if and how their personal data may be used. Since then,
policymakers, privacy advocates, and privacy researchers alike fo-
cus on the issue of informed consent to data practices. Achieving
informed consent requires that users (1) understand how their data
will be used, and (2) agree explicitly and voluntarily to the use of
their data. Both of these criteria have become increasingly difficult
to achieve since the complexity of data practices has increased sig-
nificantly, and privacy-infringing data practices have become so
ubiquitous.
4.1 Informed consent to online data practices
is difficult to achieve
Users have nuanced and context-dependent views on their accep-
tance of online behavioral advertising, understanding sites’ need
for monetization, and additional functionality enabled by track-
ing [4, 18]. However, they do not seem to fully understand that
personalized ads rely on their tracked online behavior, how wide-
spread these trackers are, which information these trackers can
access, and what types of personal information advertisers can de-
rive from their behavior [29, 31]. Users can, by definition, not give
their informed consent to data practices they do not understand.
According to GDPR rules, user consent legitimizes most forms
of privacy-infringing data practices. Hence, achieving a high rate
of consent is a goal with direct monetary value for advertisers.
Advertisers achieve high rates of “consent” by employing several
different kinds of dark patters in the user interfaces of online con-
sent notices [3, 8, 14, 17, 20]. Optimizing consent in this manner
protects advertisers’ business model while keeping up the facade
of lawful and effective informational self-determination. Efficiently
optimizing consent rates opened up a new business opportunity
for so-called consent management platforms (CMP). “OneTrust, on
its webpage presenting its CMP solution, proposes publishers to
‘maximize user opt-in with customizable publisher-specific cookie
banners [...] to optimize consent collection’ ” [15].
Aside from these fundamental issues with consent to online data
practices, there is also the issue of the sheer number of consent
decisions. Since these habituate and disengage users from consent
requests in general, it will be necessary to reduce their number
significantly.
4.2 Reduce overall number of consent
decisions
The current state of the web requires a high number of consent deci-
sions from users. Aside from an increased cognitive load, they also
habituate users to accept more cookies than they feel comfortable
with. To avoid user disengagement, these consent decisions need
to be reserved for impactful, non-trivial, and context-dependent
situations as Boehme et al. noted: “a last resort to prevent habitu-
ation is economizing consent decisions and thus reserving users’
scarce decision capacity for the really important choices.” [3] Many
consent notices unnecessarily ask users to accept data practices
that are essential for the site’s functionality (such as virtual shop-
ping carts or remembering the login status). We interpret this as
a “proliferation of choice” tactic to overwhelm users since these
cases do not even require consent according to GDPR. Additionally,
there the consent decisions regarding tracking practices that users
almost universally decline if they do not see a clear benefit to them.
Some tools that minimize consent notices already exist [11, 21,
23, 26, 32]. These apply predefined policies and thereby move away
from individual consent decisions. However, these predefined poli-
cies do not necessarily care for privacy concerns and instead focus
on the sites’ functionality, e.g., by agreeing to all data practices to
hide the consent notice.
Even if predefined decision policies handle most of the consent
notices, there remains a small set of consent decisions that are
non-trivial and can be very personal.
For these context-dependent decisions, users might want to
weigh the site’s perceived trustworthiness and the benefits of accept-
ing behavior tracking (maybe additional functionality or monetary
value) with the privacy-infringing drawbacks. In case the behavior
tracking has a direct effect on the website’s functionality (e.g., in
the case of personalized search), the website should not be allowed
to deny service, and instead, provide a gracefully degraded level
of service to users who reject tracking. In any case, these remain-
ing consent notices need a unified presentation so that users can
understand and compare important points quickly [9].
4.3 Alternative approaches to improving
privacy on the web
Achieving informed consent to data practices is not the turnkey
solution to online privacy that we desire. The individualistic right to
informational self-determination does not fight privacy-infringing
behavior itself. Instead, it provides privileged, informed, and mo-
tivated individuals a seemingly neutral decision if and how they
want to be under surveillance. As long as a sufficient number of
users “consent” to surveillance, the underlying privacy-infringing
business model continues. More regulation on how companies are
not allowed to track users and ask users for consent could turn into
an elaborate cat-and-mouse game. Hence, improving privacy on
the web as a whole can not rely on informed consent alone.
One of the reasons for ubiquitous consent decisions on the web
is that users’ consent legalizes data practices that would otherwise
undergo much more scrutiny. We can not rely on informed consent
to improve privacy on the web. Hence, we need to make these
privacy-infringing data practices more transparent, discuss the
potential consequences, and use government regulation to keep
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them in check – independent of users’ “consent” decisions. A core
issue for regulators should be the market for predictive futures since
it drives the urge to collect ever-increasing mounds of behavioral
data.
5 HOW FUTURE RESEARCH COULD
COUNTER SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM
As we discussed in detail in Section 3, prior research has invested
significant work into describing, measuring, and improving issues
revolving around tracking, targeted advertisements, and cookie
banners. These works built the foundation for further discussions
and raised awareness for the complexity of the advertisement in-
dustry and its stakeholders’ conflicting interests. While identifying
the oppressive mechanisms of the status quo is difficult already,
changing is even more so. As discussed by Keyes [10] and Asad [2],
prefigurative politics is a viable method of engaging with power. It
is a pragmatic and applied process-driven approach to producing
counter-power and counter-structures in the here and now. This
section concerns itself with smaller-scale future research directions
that could scale up to engage with the power behind current privacy
issues to realize online privacy eventually.
5.1 Shift Focus Away From Consent
Users’ consent has been a focal point of prior research, not least
because it is a central aspect of privacy laws. However, as Trevisan et
al. pointed out, the concept of consent alone might not be sufficient
to solve the issues around behavior tracking [28]. Though consent is
a necessary aspect, research can benefit from looking at the problem
from a different angle. For example, future work can focus more on
restricting the privacy-infringing data practices themselves without
depending on the users’ consent.
5.2 Examine Understudied Parties
So far, research has focused on end-users, CMPs, and the techni-
cal implementation of consent notices on websites. This focus has
avoided some of the stakeholders involved in online tracking and
advertisement. Consequently, the perspective of the advertisement
industry and the content providers remain understudied. Of these
two, the advertisement industry seems to use insights from re-
search to maximize their profits by optimizing users’ consent rates.
Hence, we do not deem it worthwhile to invest further resources
into understanding their point of view. However, understanding
the perspective of content providers might provide valuable infor-
mation to improving users’ privacy on the web. One potential area
of research is a detailed understanding of the content providers’
motivation behind incorporating tracking mechanisms. Addition-
ally, we consider it urgent to examine privacy-friendly forms of
monetization and provide incentives to content providers to shift
to them.
5.3 Individual and Collective Solutions
In our opinion, resolving the issues around tracking and cookie ban-
ners requires a combination of individual and collective solutions
that address different aspects of the problem. Individual solutions
target end-users. These can be plugins that help users detect track-
ing or make monitoring visible. Additionally, they can remove the
burden of trivial consent decisions from the user and only call them
to action when it is needed. Nowadays, we already have such tools,
usually third-party plugins or tools that proxy the users’ decisions.
From the perspective of the websites, consent management plat-
forms (CMPs), which handle the consent management for website
owners, are on the rise. The rise of CMPs is somewhat counterintu-
itive, as the sole idea behind GDPR and similar laws is to make the
process of tracking and data collection more transparent. However,
it perhaps opened up business opportunities for even more parties
to get involved with user data. Before privacy regulations came
into effect, advertisers gathered people’s data silently without their
awareness. While ubiquitous consent notices made the data collec-
tion very annoying nowadays, they did not seem to have curbed it
significantly.
We are in desperate need of collective solutions that target the
issue on a large scale. For example, legal authorities need to be
equipped with suitable measures to detect and report violations.
Trevisan et al.’s CookieCheck tool is a step in the right direction [28].
Additionally, we are convinced that the different technological par-
ties need to get involved in solving the issue, such as browsers,
search engines, and social networks. One of the biggest players,
Google, has a special kind of responsibility since they have one of
the most popular browsers and are also heavily invested in the ad
industry. Past efforts of Google in cooperation with other tech gi-
ants have demonstrated a strong ability to transform the Internet’s
ecosystem. For example, joined efforts resulted in a switch from
HTTP to HTTPS, which at the time was not widely adopted [27].
They could also significantly contribute to an improvement of the
current tracking situation if they wanted to. However, calling them
into action will undoubtedly be difficult as such endeavors counter-
act their business model.
5.4 About Science Communication and Asking
the Right Questions
We have been conducting the same research year after year – and
while it is undoubtedly important to measure the status quo, we
have not been able to counteract these privacy-invasive tendencies.
There were also early efforts to propose design guidelines, driven
by value-sensitive design, which are still relevant today [7, 19]. Un-
fortunately, many of today’s practices violate these guidelines. We
see similar tendencies also in other fields of research. For example,
in the field of email encryption, essentially the same research is
conducted over and over again, but at the core, there has been little
progress over the last 20 years. We, as a scientific community, must
try to change our perspective. If research’s efforts are not being
heard or do not have the desired effects, we need to ask ourselves
two questions: First, are we properly communicating our results
to the public and relevant authorities to make changes? Especially
when research involves practical applicability and can therefore
be fast-moving, we need to pay special attention to science com-
munication. And secondly, are we potentially asking the wrong
questions to begin with? Implicit assumptions for which we have no
evidence and which may not be correct could, for example, mislead
us to ask the wrong questions. Change is possible, but it is usually
an arduous process that brings together the combined efforts of
research, jurisdictions, and industry.
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